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INNOVATORS’ VS. NON-INOVATORS’ 








Post-transition countries struggle with their attempt to catch-up more advanced 
market economies with more or less success. Innovation activities have been 
emphasized as one of the most important factors for achieving sustainable 
growth. At the same time, innovation indicators in post-transition countries 
significantly lag behind the desired levels. According to the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard 2014, post-transition EU countries are mainly modest and 
moderate innovators. Only Estonia and Slovenia are classified among 
innovation followers. Various measurements of shadow economy usually reveal 
that its size is more pronounced in the catching-up countries. Since shadow 
economy and corruption can be perceived as major obstacle for doing 
business, we analyse whether innovators perceive this impediment to be 
systematically more important than non-innovators across different post-
transition EU countries. We expect that perception of corruption as an obstacle 
to business operations among innovators will be lower in post-transition 
countries that perform better in terms of innovation. The results imply that 
there is a link between innovation activity of the firms, perceptions of 
corruption and the evaluation of innovation enabling specificities in the 
analysed countries. Thus, in order to boost innovation, not only traditional 
innovation-supporting policy measures should be considered, but also wider 
spectrum of activities oriented towards business climate improvement.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two often emphasized problems in post-transition countries are low 
level of innovativeness and high level of corruption. The link between the two 
problems has been documented in the literature, both on the country and firm 
level. Anokhin and Schulze (2009), for example, argue that countries aiming to 
improve innovativeness should put additional efforts to control corruption. 
Corruption is perceived as major obstacle for doing business in general (De Rosa, 
Gooroochurn and Görg, 2010). Although it is generally recognised as a problem 
in societies and economies, extant literature provides evidence on possible 
positive side of corruption. Often explored question in the literature is whether 
corruption sands or greases the wheels of an economy and some of the literature 
explicitly emphasises the effects for the innovative firms.  
Meon and Sekkat (2005) argue that corruption in general cannot have 
positive effects on specific economy as their findings indicate it causes negative 
effects on investment and growth. Some studies argue that overall effect is not 
general, but depends on the specific country institutional setting. Habiyaremye 
and Raymond (2013) found that bribery by foreign firms in host countries can 
have some positive effects on their innovation activities but it is very harmful for 
innovation and R&D in transition host countries. They point out that not just 
public servants but also managers of multinationals benefit from these activities 
without dealing with externalities of corruption in long run. Some studies 
additionally argue that effects of corruption differ by types of innovation. 
Corruption is damaging for product and organizational innovation, beneficial for 
marketing innovation and has no impact on process innovation development 
(Mahagaonkar, 2008). The negative effects of corruption on product innovations 
have been also confirmed by Starosta de Waldemar (2011). 
As previously indicated, some authors emphasize that negative effects 
are more pronounced in countries with efficient governments, while in countries 
whose governments are less efficient corruption in fact can have positive effects 
(Méon and Weill, 2010). In developed economies increases in level of corruption 
leads to double or even more direct decrease of entrepreneurship than it is the 
case in developing economies (Avnimelech, Zelekha and Sharabi, 2014). 
Furthermore, effects of corruption are not the same across geographical regions. 
Corruption has negative effect on investment in transition countries but not on 
investment in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Asiedu and Freeman, 
2009). In Russia, for instance, corruption is one of the factors that reduce firms’ 
capacity to get involved in innovation activities (Chadee and Roxas, 2013). In 
transition countries higher level of corruption is related to lower economic 
prosperity (Goel and Budak, 2006). Although transition economies are usually 
not considered as developing countries according to their economic indicators, 
studies certainly reveal that the level of institutional development is not 
satisfactory. Consequently, without additional research we cannot assume the 
effects of corruption on innovation activity. 
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The “greasing the wheels” hypothesis implies revealed general benefits 
of corruption. Lui (1985) explains how both customers and public servants act to 
make bribery efficient. Positive perceptions of corruptions have been documented 
in the literature. Budak and Rajh (2011) reveal that in Western Balkan countries 
professionals with some experience in bribing are more likely to see benefits from 
corruption. Kramer (2013) finds that corruption is a solution for anomic condition 
caused by rapid changes in transition economies that in fact positively affects 
innovation development. This is found true in case of Bulgaria, one of the least 
innovative EU countries where corruption has positive effects on both radical and 
incremental innovation (Krastanova, 2014). The positive impact of corruption on 
doing business is identified also by Vial and Hanoteau (2010) who provide 
evidence on positive effects on plant growth.  
Since corruption effects have been found different in developing and 
developed economies, important issue of institutional setting has to be 
emphasized. Certainly, entrepreneurs’ intention is to overcome institutional 
barriers, and within that setting the bribing emerges as an effective practice. 
Studies have shown that opportunity motivated entrepreneurs are more sensitive 
to corruption and more likely to grease the wheels compared to necessity 
motivated entrepreneurs (Dejardin and Laurent, 2014). Furthermore, corruption 
reduces negative effects of complex regulations on entrepreneurship (Dreher and 
Gassebner, 2013). Although there is no evidence on better treatment by public 
servant, innovative firms are more likely to bribe government officials according 
to some studies (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2009). 
Discussion on greasing and sanding the wheels still remains open. 
Relying on extant findings, it can be hypothesized that corruption hinders 
innovation activities and creates an environment in which firms are unable to 
develop innovation and introduce it to the market. On the other hand, we cannot 
exclude possible benefits of corruption for innovation, as identified by existing 
studies. Thus, it remains to conclude that literature argues the effects of 
corruption depend on the specific situation.       
In this paper we analyse whether innovators perceive this impediment to 
be systematically more important than non-innovators across different countries. 
Countries in focus are post-transition EU members. They are Bulgaria, Romania, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Estonia. Of these countries only Estonia and Slovenia are innovation 
followers while rest of them are modest (Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia) and 
moderate innovators1 (Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech 
Republic). Innovation Union Scoreboard reveals that Estonia and Slovenia have 
                                                 
1 According to Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS), innovation followers are countries whose 
innovation performance is less than 20 percent above or more than 90 percent of the EU average. 
Modest innovators are the countries with innovation performance less than 50 percent of the EU 
average. Moderate innovators are those with the innovation performance below the EU average that 
ranges between 50 percent and 90 percent of the EU average. 
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the best innovation performance among selected countries. Their average 
innovation performance is only slightly below the EU average. In particular, 
Summary Innovation Index 2013 for EU-28 was 0.554. Its value for Estonia was 
0.502 and for Slovenia 0.513. Innovation performance of the rest of the selected 
countries lags behind the EU average. Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania are the 
countries with lowest innovation performance in EU. Their innovation 
performance is less than 50 percent of EU average. Summary Innovation Index 
20132 for Bulgaria was 0.188, Latvia 0.221 and Romania 0.237. The innovation 
performance of Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech 
Republic is somewhat better but still well below EU average. Their innovation 
performance ranges from 50 to 90 percent of EU average. The closest to the EU 
average of the selected post-transition moderate innovators is the Czech Republic 
with Summary Innovation Index value 0.422. Summary Innovation Indexes 2013 
for the rest of the post-transition moderate innovators are as follows: Lithuania 
0.289, Poland 0.279, Croatia 0.306, Slovakia 0.328 and Hungary 0.3513.      
At the same time, the Corruption Perceptions Index of the Transparency 
International indicates that corruption varies across the post-transition EU 
member states. The country with the lowest level of corruption perception is 
Estonia. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2013 for Estonia is 68. The 
CPI 2013 scores for the countries in our sample are: Poland 60, Lithuania and 
Slovenia 57, Latvia 53, Hungary 54, the Czech Republic and Croatia 48, Slovakia 
47, Romania 43 and Bulgaria 414. This initial overview of the rankings of 
countries according to the different indicators already provides initial indication 
that innovation performance is related to corruption level of the country. The 
relationship is, however, not straightforward. Bulgaria and Romania indeed 
struggle the most with corruption. However, Poland and Lithuania for example, 
have corruption level close to Slovenia and Estonia that both have better 
innovation performance.  
In order to further elaborate this issue, we explore the empirical 
relationship between innovation activity and corruption perceptions in the 
analysed countries. To that end, the next section contains information on the data 
used in the empirical analysis. Methodology for the empirics is briefly presented 
in Section 3, where more emphasis is put on the presentation of the results. The 




                                                 
2 Summary Innovation Index 2013 and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2013 for all countries in 
the sample are given in the table in Appendix.    
3 More information on innovation performance is available on http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm 
4 For more information on CPI visit http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results  
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2. DATA AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS  
Data used in this analysis are from the latest Business Environment 
Survey (BEEPS V) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, which relates to the years 2012-2013. 
The full database contains responses from15,600 manufacturing and services 
firms in 30 EBRD countries gathered employing face-to-face interviews.5 BEEPS 
is widely used dataset for research on corruption (e.g. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2009; Habiyaremye and Raymond, 2013, Kramer, 2013, De 
Rosa, Gooroochurn and Görg, 2010), since it enables comparative overview 
across different countries. To the extent that we omit judging on possible cultural 
differences of responding to the same question in different countries, this 
approach ensures important insight into the corruption patterns. 
The sample used in the analysis in present paper consists of 3,716 firms 
from the selected countries, among which 2,190 can be considered as innovators. 
For the purpose of this study innovators are firms that report (1) successful 
development of new or significantly improved product6, production/supply 
practice, organisational/management practices or structures, marketing methods 
and logistical or business process, and/or (2) investment in (intermural or 
extramural) R&D and and/or giving employees time to develop or try out a new 
approach or new idea about products or services, business process, firm 
management or marketing during the last 3 years. Since we have already 
emphasized in the introduction that the sampled countries lag behind in 
innovation activity, it might be surprising that the sample contains relatively large 
share of innovative firms. Consequently, we might argue that there are overall 
sample selection issues that might impede on the research focused on 
comparative analysis of innovation activity on the national level. However, we 
claim that such sample enables the analysis of the differences between innovative 
and non-innovative firms across countries because there are no a priori reasons to 
assume that there would be a systematic difference in responding to these 
questions between the two analysed subgroups. 
The question „To what degree is corruption an obstacle to the current 
operations of this establishment?“ was used to assess the perception of corruption 
of responding firms. 5-points Likert scale was offered to respondents, ranging 
from “no obstacle” to “very severe obstacle”.  The data shows that higher 
percentages of innovative firms perceive corruption as important obstacle to 
business (23.15 percent) in comparison to non-innovative firms (12.71 percent) if 
we consider overall sample. However, as Figure 1 shows, there are important 
differences in perceptions among countries. In some countries, non-innovative 
                                                 
5More on BEEPS V can be found on http://ebrd-beeps.com/ .  
6 The response rate to the first question, i.e. whether the enterprise had new or significantly improved 
product during the last the years is rather high in the sample. Thus, although some specific questions 
related to the type of innovation have higher non-response rate, since we are dealing with the overall 
innovation activity, these potential missing observation issues found in similar studies should not be 
reflected in our results. 
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firms perceive higher corruption problems (Poland), while in others countries the 
size of the problem for both population subgroups is relatively small (Estonia). 
 
 
Figure 1 Differences in perceptions of the corruption obstacles 
Source: authors’ calculations based on BEEPS. 
In order to shed some light on such findings, we analyse differences 
across countries in additional responses. BEEPS enables analysis of a number of 
interesting questions7: 
• In any of inspections or meetings with tax officials was a gift or informal 
payment expected or requested? (Variable name: Tax) 
• When establishments like this one do business with the government, 
what percent of the contract value would be typically paid in informal payments 
or gifts to secure the contract? (Variable name: Contract) 
• In reference to that application for an operating license, was an informal 
gift or payment expected or requested? (Variable name: Operating) 
• It is often said that firms make unofficial payments/gifts, private 
payments or other benefits to public officials to gain advantages in the drafting of 
laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding government decisions. To what 
extent have the following practices had a direct impact on this establishment? 
 Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Parliamentarians to affect 
their votes (Variable name: Parliament) 
                                                 
7 The term given in the brackets is used as a reference to each described question.  
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 Private payments/gifts or other benefits to Government officials to affect 
the content of government decrees (Variable name: Government) 
 Private payments/gifts or other benefits to local or regional government 
officials to affect their votes or content of government decrees (Variable name: 
Local) 
We report the percentages of innovative firms in each country that have 
reported corruption experiences as described by previous questions. 
Table1 










Poland 0 2.01 0 0.93 2.17 1.86 
Romania 4.59 0.78 2.17 3.62 4.11 3.62 
Estonia 0 0 0 0.72 0 0.72 
Czech 
Republic 0.53 3.13 0.53 9.57 7.46 6.38 
Hungary 0 15.00 0 3.13 2.34 0.78 
Latvia 0.75 0.25 0 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Lithuania 3.17 0.30 1.59 6.35 7.94 9.52 
Slovakia 0.72 0 0.72 5.76 7.19 5.76 
Slovenia 0.55 1.27 0 1.10 2.21 1.10 
Bulgaria 3.03 0 2.42 4.85 6.67 7.27 
Croatia 0 0.72 1.58 3.16 3.16 4.74 
Source: authors’ calculations based on BEEPS. 
The truthfulness in answers to every survey can be questioned. The 
answers related to corruption activity involvement should be taken with 
additional care, since such practices are often illegal not only on the demand side 
of the transaction but also for the supply side (i.e. the respondents in the survey). 
To the extent that cultural and legal differences influence the responses in 
analysed countries, the absolute comparison of different levels of percentages 
across the countries should be avoided. However, the data presented in previous 
table provides some interesting information on the differences in corruption 
perceptions across countries. For example, in Romania, the country where 
innovators perceive corruption to be relatively larger impediment to doing 
business among the analysed countries, respondents have repeated experiences in 
bribing tax and in general government officials. Such practice could be related to 
the “greasing the wheel” hypothesis, when government procedures are not 
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developed in adequate manner, so that the entrepreneurs seek alternative ways to 
overcome business barriers. 
It is interesting also to note that in some countries enterprises are 
expected to provide gifts to local levels of government (Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania), while in others parliament seems to be the place where innovators 
seek opportunities to enhance their businesses (Czech Republic, Hungary). 
Although probably the most unreliable question – the percentage of contract 
amount paid as a bribe – the average number for Hungary seems really high.  
In order to investigate the relationship between corruption and 
innovation output, we have to bear in mind that innovation propensity on a firm 
level also depends on a large number of factors. Some of the widely studied 
issues in innovation literature are how firm size (e.g. Hausman, 2005, Keizer, 
2002) and sector in which firm operates (e.g. Lööf 2005, Forsman 2011, 
Becheikh et al. 2006,) reflect in innovation activities. Thus, in our empirical 
estimates, we include variables firm size and sector to control for these factors. 
Three dummy variables have been considered as a sector indicator – 
manufacturing, retail and services – as available from the BEEPS data. The four 
dummy variables for the size were related to the micro enterprises, small, medium 
and large, where the classification has been taken from the BEEPS survey, thus 
ensuring the comparability across countries. Other control variables we use to 
explain innovation output in this paper are firm age, ownership (private or state) 
and operating as a part of larger group. We have also considered turnover of the 
firm, productivity (measured as turnover per employee) and employment changes 
during the period captured by the survey as control variables, but none of these 
were significant (or in some cases adequate choices due to potential endogeneity, 
multicolinearity or other econometric issues) in our specifications.    
Relying on these data, specific empirical strategy as well as results is 
further discussed in the following section. 
 
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Initial investigation on the country level has shown that there is a 
negative correlation between the innovation scoreboard index and the share of 
innovative firms perceiving corruption to be important obstacles for their 
business (correlation coefficient -50.85). This implies that countries in which 
corruption is perceived as an important problem by innovative firms also lag 
behind in overall innovative performance.  
The question is whether we can find evidence in the sample to reveal if 
firms who perceive corruption as an obstacle innovate more or less (the so called 
grease versus sand hypothesis as indicated in introduction). We first estimate 
simple matching model in order to estimate the impact of corruption perceptions 
on innovation activity. Specifically, we use the average treatment effect of the 
treated (ATT) framework where we assume that corruption perception is the 
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treatment variable and innovation activity is the outcome variable. Within the 
propensity score matching procedure, initial set of variables considered usual 
determinants of innovation activity (size, sector, ownership, age) referred to in 
other studies8. Balanced property has been satisfied and the estimates were 
restricted to common support. Although it can be assumed that there are 
important endogeneity constraints, we have used this methodology to gain first 
insights into the relationship between the two variables of interest. 
Table 2 
ATT estimates: innovation outcome conditional on perceiving corruption to be an 
obstacle 
Method Estimated ATT Standard errors Treated/controls 
Nearest neighbour 0.177*** 0.028 699/601 
Kernel matching 0.172*** 0.019  
Source: authors’ estimates based on BEEPS. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that the firms, which have stated that they 
perceive corruption to be important obstacle for their business activity, are still 
more likely to have innovative activities (innovation output) than their matched 
counterparts. This would either corroborate the “greasing” hypothesis or indicate 
the firms’ determination to innovate in spite of perceived obstacles. The latter 
could be interpreted optimistically, having in mind the Innovation Scoreboard 
results for the analysed countries. However, inspection of the sample shows that 
there are a disproportionally high number of innovative firms in the sample. 
Consequently, the sample structure itself might provide too optimistic evidence 
for judging the actual situation in the analysed countries.  
In order to explicitly deal with sample selection issues, we rephrase the 
research question. We investigate whether we can find the determinants of the 
innovation activity of the firms in the analysed countries, conditional on the fact 
that they consider the corruption to be important obstacle for their business 
activity. The dependent variable is thus whether the firm has been classified as 
innovative. This has been modelled with the Heckman probit procedure. 
Corruption perception has been put into relationship with different performance 
scores of innovation scoreboard index in order to incorporate the different 
economic conditions the firms face in the analysed countries. The results of the 
estimates are presented in the following table9. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The probit estimates from the propensity score matching algorithm available from the authors upon 
request. 





Propensity of innovation, controlling for corruption perceptions 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Innovation – probit equation 
Constant 0.777** 0.303 
Age -0.002 0.005 
Private firm 0.061 0.162 
Segment of larger firm 0.078 0.191 
Small  0.384* 0.196 
Medium 0.476** 0.207 
Large 0.847*** 0.262 
Manufacturing 0.240** 0.096 
Corruption – selection equation  
Constant -2.871*** 0.820 
Human resources 5.937*** 1.728 
Research  system 13.624*** 1.869 
Finance and support -3.206 0.650 




Intellectual assets -3.024*** 0.750 
Innovators 4.139*** 1.107 
Economic effects -1.481*** 0.466 
Diagnostics 
N=3714 Wald chi2(7)=20.75*** LR (rho=0) chi2=16.30*** 
Censored=3015 Log likelihood=-2033.607 Wald (rho=0) 
chi2=16.06*** 
Uncensored=699 Rho=-.607 (.117)  
Notes: ***denotes significance at the level of 1 percent, ** at the level of 5 
percent and * at the level of 1 percent. 
Source: authors’ estimates based on BEEPS. 
Since our results have shown that the rho value is statistically different 
from zero, the overall likelihood of the estimates is not equal to the sum of the 
likelihoods of selection equation and probit equations. Consequently, sample 
selection correcting for the perception on corruption makes sense. Thus, we have 
found that the probability of innovation activity is increasing with the size of the 
enterprise and the sector the enterprise operates in, conditioning on the corruption 
perception differences. It also shows that some of the frequently emphasized 
determinants of innovation activity of firm – being a segment of a larger 
enterprise or operating as a private firm (as opposed to state ownership) – were 
not significant for our countries.  
Additionally, it is interesting to note - from the selection equation - the 
relationship between various dimensions of Innovation Scoreboard index and 
corruption perceptions of sampled firms in post-transition countries. The results 
INNOVATION 255 
 
imply that in the countries with more favourably assessed human resources, 
research system and innovators in general, corruption is more likely to be 
perceived as the important obstacle to doing business. On the opposite side, 
countries in which firm investment, linkages and entrepreneurship, intellectual 
assets and economic effects were assessed more favourably, firms seem to have 
put less emphasis on the corruption to being important obstacle for doing 
business. It could be argued that these correlations are due to the fact that the 
indicators themselves represent the countries the firms originate from. Even with 
this indirect connection, it seems that these factors which are used for innovation 
performance rating are also correlated with corruption perception of the firms.  
The results presented in this paper imply that there is a link between 
innovation activity of the firms, perceptions of corruption and the evaluation of 
innovation enabling specificities in the analysed countries. Since innovation 
scoreboard indicators are frequently taken into account by policy makers when 
considering new innovation policy measures, it is important to notice that they 
should also consider wider set of business climate indicators, including corruption 
perceptions. Such combined perspective might results in the better coordination 
of overall economic policy mix, that might boost additional innovation activity 
and consequently spur overall catching-up process. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The main focus in this paper was to empirically analyse the relationship 
between corruption perceptions and innovation activity in the post-transition 
European economies. The reason for choosing the sampled countries is that they 
have been frequently assessed in public debates as well as in research studies as 
lagging behind more innovative economies and having important governance 
impediments for successful entrepreneurship development. Based on the BEEPS 
data, we have confirmed that in most of the analysed countries innovative firms 
perceive corruption to be major impediment for their business activity, even more 
so than non-innovative firms emphasize the same issue. Since innovation activity 
is relatively low in these countries, it could be argued that general policy 
recommendation to enhance the efforts to reduce corruption should be made, 
since corruption might deter potential innovators from their activities. 
Empirical analysis has shown that firms still innovate in the analysed 
countries, even if they perceive corruption to be important impediment for their 
business activity. Based on these results we cannot argue that innovation activity 
would be higher if corruption perceptions were lower in the analysed countries. It 
might be the case that enterprises have found the way to operate within the 
society labelled by high corruption perceptions and that sudden changes of the 
system could also create additional obstacles. Or it might be the case that 
decreasing corruption would reduce their operating costs and thus enable better 
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business performance. Such causal relationships are beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
We have, however, established that the degree of corruption perceptions 
reported by the respondents in the analysed countries is related to different 
segments of overall innovation scoreboard index. Consequently, corruption 
perceptions are correlated also with other factors contributing to overall business 
climate in a specific country, which makes it more or less favourable for 
innovation activity.  
Our analysis has additionally shown that after corruption perceptions are 
accounted for, innovation propensity is higher for firms that are larger (in 
comparison to micro firms) and also the firms in manufacturing (in comparison to 
services and retail). The first finding might be related to the issue of access to 
finance, where larger firms have more and better established links with financing 
institutions. Although manufacturing and services are rather similar when it 
comes to innovation (Sirilli and Evangelista, 1998), our results reveal that 
manufacturing firms in selected countries are more likely to innovate. This might 
indicate presence of structural industrial differences in post-transition EU 
countries when it comes to innovation and calls for further research focusing on 
specific sector or industry.  
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Summary Innovation Index and Corruption Perceptions Index for the countries in 
the sample in 2013 
 Summary Innovation Index Corruption Perceptions Index 
Estonia 0.502 68 
Slovenia 0.513 57 
the Czech Republic 0.422 48 
Hungary 0.351 54 
Slovakia 0.328 47 
Croatia 0.306 48 
Poland 0.279 60 
Lithuania 0.289 57 
Bulgaria 0.188 41 
Latvia 0.221 53 
Romania 0.237 43 
Sources: Innovation Union Scoreboard and Transparency International. 
 
 
